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Die Grenzen meiner Sprache
bedeuten die Grenzen meiner Welt.
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l. INrnopucrroN
The present paper aims at a brief critique of Whorls ideas concerning linguistic
relativity. To compensate for the paucity of secondary sources, an effort has been made
to let Whorf speak for himself, and to base each critical comment on original quota-
tions. Whorf is an exciting thinker with a gift for the quotable statement and is thus a
critic's delight. Owing to the nature of his thought, this paper will often stray from a
strict linguistic focus in order to concentrate on some of the broader issues Whorf
deliberately raises. Notice that no attempt has been made, for the moment, to trace his
connection with Edward Sapir.
A note on the references to Whorfs work is in order here. In the text, each
reference has the year in which the article was either written or published. This is done
in order to give a rough chronology of some key ideas. Some of Whorf s contributions
were unpublished and undated at the time of his early death. John B. Carroll deter-
mined the possible year of writing, sometimes with some degree of uncertainty. The
page numbers refer to Carroll's edition 
-listed in the references-, the most accessiblesource for the study of Whorf.
2, LlNcu¡srIc RELATTvTTY
Whorf seems to have been considering linguistic relativity for some time before he
began his studies of American Indian tongues. In an unpublished article dated around
1927, Whorf has this to say when he rounds up a brief assessment of contemporary
trends in psychology:
One fact that stands out to a detached viewpoint, ..., is the great and perhaps basic
importance of the principle we denote by the word "meaning". Meaning will be fbund to be
rThe discussion that follows is partly based on my Ph. D. dissertation at present approaching comple-
tion. This is why I am writing in English; due apology is offered to any kind reader willing to wade through
these pages.
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intimately c<¡nnected with the linguistic: its principle is svnrbolism, but language is the great
symbolism from which other symbolisms take their cue (Wh«rrf 1927 42).
Two important aspects of Whorls thought stand out in the quotation above: his
emphasis on meaning and on the power of language to determine the other systems by
which men describe reality and interact with it. Let us look at the former in some detail.
2.1. Meaning and semantic fields. According to Whorl linguistics is essentially the quest
for meaning. All the complex apparatus of articulatory description and grammatical
modelling is at the service of casting light on "the thick darkness of the language, and
thereby of much of the thought, the culture and the outlook upon life of a given
community" (Whorf 1936c: 73). Elsewhere he states that "The very essence of linguis-
tics is the quest for meaning". In the process of doing so, linguistics becomes involved in
psychological and cultural issues while retaining its rigor and precision (Whorf' 1936c:
79). How is meaning generated? Whorf maintains that meaning does not result from
the isolated units of the language but from the patterned relations between words and
morphemes. The latter are mere motor reactions, whereas the relations resulting in
nreaning are the outcome of "neural processes and linkages..., silent, invisible and
individually unobservable". (Whorf 1936: 67-68). These processes establish rhe rapport
(Whorfs own term) that leads to meaning.
Notice the emphasis on mental processes in the generation of meaning, rather than
on observable S+r... $+R chains. Such an emphasis on the importance of mental
activity not directly accessible to observation is in direcr opposition to the views of
Leonard Bloomfield, who discarded the study of meaning as almost beyond the reach
of scientific inquiry. One might venture the n<¡tion that, in this respect, Whorf antici-
pates the concern of later linguists over the internal, cognitive processes involved in the
acquisition and generation of language.
One particular aspect of Whorfs approach to meaning would fit very well in
linguistic relativity. His studies of American Indian languages led him to postulate the
existence of "oligosynthetic" languages. In these, the vocabularies are built up of what
he called simple pieces of articulatory behavior ("phonemes" in modern terminology)
plus a broad idea or a complex of related ideas that goes with that behavi<¡r. According
to Carroll (1956: 25), this may well be a re-statement of the idea that sounds and
meanings are somehow related. For instance, Whorf claims that in Maya a stem such as
QI- was almost always associated with notions of 'burn', 'radiate', 'glow', 'scatter'. He
went on to say that nearly all of the vocabulary in oligosynthetic languages could be
accounted for in terms of a relatively limited number of roots or significant elements
allocated to a few certain meanings (Carroll 1956: 12-13). Because of this postulate,
Whorfs contribution has become associated with semantic field theory (see Waterman
1957 for a more detailed treatment of the subject).
In brief, Whorfs view of linguistics as a science directed to the understanding of
meaning jand hence to the understanding of a culture's whole view of the world-
would lead him to the idea of linguistic relativity. The concept of oligosynthesis was also
a step in that direction since it carried the implication that different languages could
generate different sets of associated ideas and by consequence produce different
classifications of experience.
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2.2. Langu.ages and the classification of experience. Mention has already been made of
Whorfls early preoccupation with language as the basis for other symbolic systems.
Whatever the value of this generalization, it is clear that it would fit comfortably within a
scheme of patterned relations between words, as exemplified by oligosynthesis. About
eight years after his 1927 manuscript, the first formulation of linguistic relativity
appeared as a conclusion of a study of Hopi verbs:
... language first of all is a classification and arrangement of the stream of sensory experience
which results in a certain world-order, a certain segment of the world that is easily expressible
by the type of symbolic means that language employs (Whort 1936a: 55)2.
In Whorfs view, language parallels the function of science as a means of organizing
and categorizing experience, although he admits that language is not as precise despite
its greater versatility.
Whorfwasquicktofollowuponeof theimplicationsof hisconclusions. If language
is a medium through which man organizes and categorizes experience, then quite
possibly different languages will render different accounts of reality. His analyses of
Hopi, for example, pointed to radical differences in the treatment of time, resulting in a
language that gets along perfectly well without tenses, among other distinguishing
features. The conclusion is inevitable:
Just as it is possible to have any number of geometries other than the Euclidian which give an
equally perfect account of space configurations, so it is possible to have descriptions of the
universe, all equally valid, that do not contain our familiar contrasts of time and space
(Whorf 1936b; 58).
Eventually Whorf would develop his analyses of Hopi into a comparison with all
western European languages. The latter were subsumed under the label of Standard
Average European (SAE), a label which seems to have appeared in l94l. Behind such a
designation is the idea that most European languages share common traits as regards
their treatment of time, space, substance and matter (Whorf 194 l; 138).
In this manner, Whorf finally arrived at the hypothesis that languages divide
experience in different ways while determining the speakers' view of reality. The
tongues of the world classify and determine perception in at least two significant
respects. Firstly, there is the categorization of objects and events, and here we find the
examples most widely associated with linguistic relativity. The Hopi use the same w<.¡rd
for insect, airplane, and aviator. Where we use the same term for snow, the Eskimo use
at least three. To the Aztecs, cold, ice, and snow were all expressed by the same word
with different endings. And so on (Whorf 1940a: 216).
Secondly and more subtly, the categories used to describe "reality", such as space
and time, differ from language to language. These concepts are not the same for all
men but "depend upon the nature of the language or languages through the use of
which they have been developed" (Whorf l94l: 158). Ultimately,language is no mere
passive reflection of a given view of the world; it is the element that actually conditions
2lt is in this article that Whorf makes his famous statement that Hopi is "better equipped to deal with...
vibratile phenomena than is our latest scientiñc terminology". Such a statement fairly invites the question: If
Hopi is so suited to physics, why isn't there a Hopi wave mechanics or similar developments?
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such a view of the world. Here is the classical formulation of the linguistic relativity
principle:
...the background linguistic system (in other words, the grammar) of each language is not
merely a reproducing instrument but rather is itself the shaper of ideas, the program and
guide for the individual's mental activity, for his analysis of impressions, for his synthesis of
his mental stock in trade. Formulation of ideas is not an independent process, strictly rational
in the old sense, but is a part of a particular grammar, and differs, from slightly to greatly,
between different grammars. We dissect nature along lines laid by our native languages.
(Whorf 1940a: 2 l2-213).
Clearly then, speaker and listener are tightly bound together in the grip of their
language. The apparently free flow of speech is actually controlled by the grammar as
regards both the contents of the commuñication, and also the view of reality shared by
speakerand listener. To Whorf, the influence of the basic grammar of the language was
tantamount to that of a law of nature, just as unconscious and inevitable as gravitation
(Whorf 1940b: 221).
Such is the importance accorded to language in Whorls system that it has primacy
in the question as to which was first: the language or the cultural norms. He contends
that they may have grown together but language changes much more slowly and
consequently wields the decisive influence in its interaction with the culture.
3. Evtor¡,¡cr AND cRrrreuEs
Linguistic relativity is also known as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesi"s. As such, one may well
wonder whether it has ever been put to the test. In the pages that follow, three main
lines of evidence are discussed, in the full realization that they are a very small fraction
of what has been published about the subject. The first is mainly neurological while the
other two are linguistic. While linguistic relativity is explicitly stated to be relevant to the
first, the remaining two are included because of my own interpretation of their rele-
vance to the topic of this paper. The third part of this section is devoted to some general
considerations.
3.1. Brain encoding and second langtnges. A recent overview of research into the way
languages are stored in the brain (Benderly 198 I ) indicates that two or more languages
share some brain space but each also has areas of its own. The evidence is considered
that different languages actually imprint themselves differently on the brain, possibly
owing to their physical differences (pitch, ratio of vowels to consonants, type of alphabet,
lay-out of symbols on the page, etc.). Evidence is also quoted to the effect that Hopi and
English are encoded differently: bilingual Hopi-English children show more activity on
the right hemisphere while they are using Hopi. According to the researchers quoted by
Benderly (p. l2), the conceptual differences Whorf pointed to ("appositional" Hopi v/s
"propositional" English) might explain the differences observed.
On the "con" side, Benderly brings in <¡ther data indicating that <¡rder c¡f language
learning may affect differentiati<¡n in the brain. Also "socially sub<¡rdinate individuals
generally show greater right-hemisphere involvement", so the social status of Hopi can
also be invoked as an alternative explanation. Further complicating evidence involves
other bilinguals 
-including speakers of American Indian languages- who appear toprocess both languages on the same side.
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Summing up, research into brain encoding has revived interest in the Sapir-Whorf
hypothesis without turning up any conclusive evidence for or against it.
3.2 The non-SAE speaker through a SAE meüum. Although evidence from neurology is
inconclusive, some applied linguistic data appear to be more positive. The rationale for
the interpretation of the data is as follows: if the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis is true, then
some important aspects of the non-SAE worldview should show through in the per-
formance of non-SAE speakers using a SAE language. Discounting the more obvious
departures from native standards in pronunciation, vocabulary and syntax, the idea is
to look for possible influence of non-SAE ways of organizing and presenting informa-
tion and impressions in the SAE performance of non-natives. Two investigations are
briefly discussed below.
Kaplan (11172: 33 ff) conducted a study of written work by university students
coming from no fewer than l6 native language backgrounds, and analyzed the organiz-
ational structure of 600 written compositions. After studying the deviations from
acceptable paragraph development in English, Kaplan was able to trace some of the
deviations to the rhetorical traditions into which some members of the group had been
educated in their native countries. For example, the parallel constructions found in
paragraph development in Arabic were also found in the English compositions of
Arabic-'speaking students. Similarly, Kaplan detected strong elements of Chinese clas-
sical rhetoric in the written work of Chinese-speaking students. This allowed him to
conclude that "each language and each culture has a paragraph order unique to itself,
and that part of the learning of a particular language is the mastering of its logical
system" (Kaplan 1972: 63). The connection with Whorfs ideas is obvious.
Evidence to the contrary is not hard to find. In his analysis of the specialized
scientific paper and lecture, Ewer ( 1978: 6) notes that "the discourse structure of formal
science is register-speciñc, not Ianguage or national culture-specific". Preliminary
analyses of scientific papers translated from Japanese suggest that their organization is
virtually identical with that of papers by native speakers of English. Studies of work in
English written by speakers of tongues as different as Spanish (Mage 1978), Macedo-
nian (Koneóni 1978), and Japanese (Sugimoto 1978), all of them in Trimble, Trimble
and Drobnic (1978) confirm Ewer's assertion. In other words, formal scientific dis-
course tends to display the same rhetorical characteristics regardless of the writer's
nationality or cultural background. Thus Whorfs hypothesis is tentatively confirmed
by Kaplan but possibly weakened by Ewer. What is one to make of these apparently
contradictory results?
In fact, there is no contradiction. Kaplan's sample consisted of university students
in ESL classes in the United States whereas Ewer's non-native users were mature,
fully-qualified professionals, presumably with extensive formal and informal exposure
to the language of specialized scientific communication. Moreover, the topics in Ka-
plan's sample included the perennial favorites of composition teachers: "What I think
of America", "A fámous person in my country", "My grandmother", etc. Evidently,
both sets of results refer to two different types of learners or, to be more precise, to
non-native users of English at two different stages in their mastery of the foreign
language. Thus, the conventions of native rhetorical patterns may initially create
cultural dissonance in learners from non-Western cultures. Increased maturity and
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exposure to technical communication in English tend to wear down cultural barriers
and to lead to the culturally-neutral features observed by Ewer. As a matter of fact,
Whorf himself was aware of transculturation through science and had a reply ready in
defense of his thesis. [t is only fair then that he should be granted the last word on the
issue:
That modern Chinese or Turkish scientists describe the world in the same terms as Western
scientists means, of course, only that they have taken over bodily the entire Western systems
of rationalizations, not that they have corroborated it from their native posts of observation
(Whorf 1940a: 214).
3.3. Some qrnlificatioru. The central postulate of Whorf s theory is that language deter-
mines the categories by which we describe reality and interact with it. Even the experi-
ence of time and matter is determined by the nature of the language through which
theyhavebeendeveloped(Whorf l94l:158).Thispostulateisdefendedonthebasisof
contrastive examples from SAE and non-SAE languages. Basically, our view of "reality"
is conditioned by our language.
Now, if the above summary is not a gross misrepresentation, then Whorf may be
guilty of a truism of sizable proportions. In contrasting the Hopi and SAE world-views,
Whorf is actually comparing a rural, prescientific, non-technological community with
an urban, technological society, just to mention the more ostensive differences. Apart
from the general similarities in physiological needs and constitution, there are large
sectors of social experience in which an urban white-collar or blue-collar worker has
little in common with a hunter-farmer in a desert environment. In turn, the latter
shares few social and environmental traits with a member of a fishing community in the
South Pacific. And so on and so forth. The languages are different because ¡he realities
are different. The physical environment and the constellation of social and individual
roles are sufficiently far apart to give rise to fundamental differences in the ways each
language organizes the raw data of experience. Each community selects from its
environment those facts and concepts most relevant to its survival and welfare and
includes them in the language. To attempt a bit of shorthand, it is experience that
determines the language, and not the other way around. Let us see how this operates by
turning some of Whorfs own examples against his theory.
The Eskimo distinguishes different conditions of snow and assigns a separate word
to each. Now, arguing that this distinction originates in the categories of the language is
not very convincing. After all, it can be countered that such precise distinctions are
essential to a community whose very sustenance and mobility depend on a knowledge of
various snow conditions, among other environmental factors.
Again, the Hopi language does not distinguish between insect, airplane and aviator,
Whorf tells us. Why should it? The Hopi in their original culture had no need to
discriminate between those objects. On the other hand, it does not take a great deal of
imagination to picture the resulting catastrophes if SAE speakers failed to make such
distinctions3.
3Further negative evidence has been produced by various researchers, particularly Berlin and Kay
( 1969), Heider and Olivier ( 1972), Rosch ( 1972). The main thrust of these investigations has been to weaken
the Whorfian hypothesis precisely in the domain where it made its strongest claims, i.e., that of colors. Thus,
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Whorf clearly states that "We dissect nature along lines laid by our native lan-
guages". Well, not quite. Experience plays a more determining role, a fact for which
there is good evidence. Important aspects of perception are independent of language.
In effect, Milgran (1974, quoted in Morain 1976:214-215) has discussed mental maps,
i.e., "the picture of a city that a person carried in his mind: the streets, neighborhoods,
and squares that are important to him; the way th'ey are linked together; and the
emotional charge attached to each element". Consequently, different people have
different mental maps which differ not only from individual to individual but also from
the topographical map of the city. Milgran found that social class and life experience
play a decisive role in these mental maps. For example, he interviewed 200 Parisians of
the professional and blue-collar classes and noted that while 84% of the professionals
could identify the UNESCO complex,only 24% of the workers knew it. These differen-
tial perceptions exist despite the common native language background of the subjects.
Contrary to Whorls argumentation, we act upon the world, experience shapes percep-
tions, and these are reflected in the language.
Vocabulary is then a weak spot in Whorls theory, and further criticism is possible, if
time permitted. Instead, Iet us turn to the subtler distinctions incorporated in the syntax
of various languages. Whorf accumulated impressive evidence of the wealth and
complexity of Hopi, for example, and how it operates in ways totally different from
SAE. And yet, further investigation shows interesting similarities underlying the differ-
ences in surface structure. To take just one case, let us consider his interpretation of the
Hopi system of modality.
Whorf (1938: ll8-124) categorized a variety of Hopi particles which have the
function of indicating various attitudes of the speaker to what he is saying. Some of
these particles correspond to the English modals, other to expressions such as "they
say", "may nevertheless", etc., all of them reflecting the listener/speaker's assessment of
the truth, probability or credibility of utterances. He concludes that the Hopi system of
modality is particularly striking both in its variety and finesse. He goes to great lengths
to stress the very large range of meanings Hopi can express through these structures.
Naturally, it can be objected that English modals are also capable of a broad
spectrum of distinctions going well beyond the mere lists of functions found in most
grammar books. The subject is too complex to be discussed in detail here, but one
example can illustrate this point. In a recent study of the modals in formal scientific
discourse, Ewer (1979) has found no fewer than 43 primary meanings distributed in
only l6 modal verbs and combinations. These exemplify a variety of obserued writer/
speaker attitudes. [n addition to these primary meanings, Ewer has detected special
uses at least equal in finesse to anything Whorf found in Hopi. Such functions as
"value-lowering" and "value-raising" (plus their attendant component functions) reveal
that ultimately there seems to be no qualitative difference in this respect between Hopi
Berlin and Kay produce evidence that undermines the idea that the color terms of languages determine how
people categorize colors. Their observations point to the existence oflanguage-independent color categories.
Again, Rosch investigated the learning of color categories, which she found to be determined not by the
mother tongue but by the universal salience of focal colors (i.e., prototypical colors). Thus, it is the perceptual
categories that determine linguistic categories, and not the other way around, as Whorf claims. Further
negative data are discussed in the pages above.
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and English 
- 
and SAE, by extension (Ewer 1979: 19-24). All this is very much in
conformity with the principle of affability; what can be said in one language, can be said
in another. Languages may differ in structure at the more observable levels but there
may well be a large degree of similarity in the speech acts performed. In fact, both
speech-act theory and the concept of linguistic universals are useful tools for further
critical analysis of the Sapir-Whorf theorya.
CoNcr-usloN
The preceding discussion has been skeptical about the philosophical aspects of Whorf s
hypothesis. Quite possibly even more serious reservations have been made in the
literature. Why is it then that linguistic relativity still manages to attract academic
interest? There seem to be two main reasons for this.
Firstly, Whorls ideas cannot be considered to be a hypothesis in a very strict sense
of the term. Linguistic relativity does not offer models or make predictions in any
scientific sense, despite Whorls own allegiance to linguistics as a science. Thus, it does
not lend itself to the more or less rigorous procedures used at present to verify linguistic
generalizations. What linguistic relativity does do, however, is to provide informed
speculation about language and behavior, and to make challenging judgements about
their relationship. Speculation is of course a perfectly legitimate attitude in a scientist as
long as it is recognized as such and no more. It speaks well of Whorf and his followers
and commentators that in practice linguistic relativity has never been conferred the
status of a proven theory but has been looked upon as an imaginative and yet plausible
extrapolation of certain linguistic data.
Secondly and finally, Whorf is possibly unique among modern linguists in his
capacity for stating a highly suggestive theory about human behavior and for stating it in
language easily accessible to the n<¡n specialist. Whorf is alone among major linguists in
his ability to be understood without recourse to commentators and analysts, a striking
figure in a field not noted for the esthetic quality of its writin95.
In summary, the combination of informed speculation and memorable statements
will continue to ensure for Whorfs ideas the fame accorded to those theories more
noted for their beauty than for their truth.
aOne instance of criticism based on universals is that by Emmon Bach. In defending his contention that
nouns should be introduced into English sentences by way of relative clauses, Bach suggests that a system of
logical rules underlies the distinctions individual [anguages make between the parts of speech. I{is conclusion
is that through this system "it is possible to convey any conceptual content in any language, even though the
particular lexical items available will vary widely from one language to another 
-a 
direct denial of the
Humboldt-Sapir-Whorf hypothesis in its strongest form" (Bach l96U: 122).
"On the negative side, Whorfs accessibility has gained him a permanent place in the ideology of those
who profer the trivia on "culture" teaching so often found in many foreign language teachingjournals in the
U.S. and elsewhere.
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